150 The Idea of the Inexpressible*
(T 5.6), here he identifies the limits of one's language with the-
Emits of one's self. The use of *my language' and 'my world*"
implicitly introduce the notion of solipsism. In solipsism only
one's own self and what one experiences exist which cannot be
described.
The second proposition 'What can be shown, cannot be said*~
(T 412.12). In one sense it means what they 'show*, in another
they cannot say what they 'show'. Showing of what can be.
'shown* and said is an 'external' showing whereas showing of
what can only be 'shown' but not said is an internal showing.-
Thus the internal structure of reality can only be shown by
language, not described in sentences. According to Wittgen-
stein, what is shown is mystical, and cannot be put into words.
In the third proposition, "what we cannot speak about we
must consign to silence (T 7).
Silence, in the Wittgensteinian sense is not complete silence or
not uttering any sound. It means simply that we do not try to
say what cannot be said. Thus silence is not ineffable or comp-
lete lack. Wittgenstein's inexpressible doctrine which is really
important, cannot be said but only shown. The subject matter
which ethics, aesthetics, religion, which are higher cannot be
expressed in ordinary language.
7.1 General concluding remarks
Firstly, I think the 'inexpressible* means inadequate expression
or communication, but not complete silence. This idea is-
related to the idea of the indistinct and indefinite. Thus an
idea is inexpressible in the sense that it is not adequately, comp-
letely and exactly expressed through our language. One can
taie any fact or object, that is expressed to a certain extent and
, i^ofitranafcsiiiexpressibfe. And the portion of it which is;
expressed is abo inadequate. In other words sometimes we utter
certain thin^ wbfcfe do not coavey a»y sense and meaning and
^^^ikexpc^sible^; U|topa^&,wj^hcmt a de&ute mea
W B®t language. We cannot give proper meaning.or state